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TRADE-MARKS AND THE MONOPOLY PHOBIA
Beverly W. Pattishall*
1914, the late Edward S. Rogers, who was to become known as
the Dean of the trade-mark bar, concluded his book, Good Will
Trade-Marks and Unfair Trading, as follows:
"People are beginning to realize that business should be conducted as games are played among gentlemen-not only in
accordance with the letter of the rules but with a proper sense
of sportsmanship. The courts are more and more reflecting this
healthy public sentiment, and are alive to the fact that in business
as in the ordinary affairs of life there are things which while in
violation of no express law, decent people do not do. Judges are
realizing that relief in these cases cannot be made to depend upon
principles of law evolved in past centuries concerning contracts,
trade-marks, literary property and the like, when conditions were
different, affairs less complex and when parasitic ingenuity was
less highly developed."

I

N

During the thirty-eight years that have elapsed since publication
of the above, it appeared for a time that Mr. Rogers' view that business should be conducted "as games are played among gentlemen"
would be written into the common law of this country, as it has been
largely into that of England. But in recent years, and particularly
during the last decade, retrogression seems to have been dominant in
the standards imposed by the courts for business ethics in matters of
trade identification.1 This writer submits that a primary causation
,,. Member, Illinois Bar.-Ed.
lSee: Lunsford, "Woe Unto You Trade-Mark Owners," 49 Mxca. L. REv. 1103
(1951); Lunsford, "Trade-Mark Infringement and Confusion of Source: Need for Supreme
Court Action," 35 VA. L. REv. 214 (1949); Lunsford, "Are Our Courts Protecting 'Secondary Meaning' Trade-Marks?" 39 T.M. REP. 767 (1949); Oppenheim, "The Public
Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial Property," 40 T.M. REP. 613 at 622-636 (1950);
Callmann, ''The 'Sunkist' Decision: Trade-Marks at the Crossroads," 38 T.M. RE.e. 304
(1948). Also decisions denying relief in: S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, (2d Cir.
1949) 175 F. (2d) 176; National Nu Grape Co. v. Guest, (10th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d)
874; Philco Corp. v. F & B Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 958; Judson Dunaway
Corp. v. Hygienic Products Co., (1st Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 461; Federal Telephone &
Radio Corp. v. Federal Television Corp., (2d Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 250.
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of the retreat is a mistaken and contradictory application of the current antipathy for anything thought to smack of monopoly.

I

If it can be said that trade-mark rights are, in fact, monopoly
rights, it must be added that they are monopoly rights justified in the
same way that one's own particular physiognomy is a monopoly or
one's rights enumerated in the first ten amendments to the Constitution are individual monopolies.
The anti-trust acts are directed only toward monopolies that are
in "restraint of trade." Trade, says Webster, is an "Act or business of
exchanging commodities by barter or sale." Obviously, trade, as we know
it, is impossible without individual identity; and equally obviously,
identity. in trade without trade-marks cannot be had. The avowed
purpose of the anti-trust acts is to encourage competitive trade and to
prohibit unfair monopoly. Thus, to affirm and further the doctrines
of the anti-trust acts, but to inhibit the protection of trade-marks and
other means for commercial identification, is patently contradictory.
The word "monopoly" has been in recent years almost an anathema to businessmen. It seems to have become inescapably linked
with the adjective, "vicious," and the courts have found one behind
almost every commercial "bush." It is now often said that to put a
patent into litigation is virtually to have it declared invalid, or, at
best, 'not infringed. Attorney Generals of the United States point
with pride at a record of having filed more anti-trust actions than any
of their predecessors. Success and consequent bigness now seem to
be evil, per se. The trend has had numerous significant repercussions in the economy, the results of which may or may not be in the
public interest.2 The language of many decisions3 governing the protection of trade-marks and names reveals, however, that this "anti2 See: Oppenheim, ''Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual
Property," 40 T.M. REP. 613 (1950); CHAMllBRLIN, THB THEORY OP MoNo.eousnc
CoMPBTITION, 6th ed., (1948). Professor Oppenheim aptly refers to this trend as "the
reasoning of the restrictionists." See also: Hamilton, ''Patents and Free EnteIPrise," TNEC
Monograph No. 31 (1941); Rostow, "Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?" 43 Iu.. L. R:Bv. 745 (1949); Johnston and Stevens, "Monopoly or MonopolizationA Reply to Professor Rostow," 44 h.L, L. RBv. 269 (1949).
3 A few are Sunbeam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam CofPoration, (9th Cir. 1950) 183 F.
(2d) 969; Eastern Wine CoIP. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., (2d Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 955;
Dixie Cola Laboratories v. The Coca-Cola Co., (4th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 352; R.C.A.
Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, (2d Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 86; Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Rohrlich, (2d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 969 at 982; California Fruit Growers Exchange v.
Sunkist Baking Co., (7th Cir. 1947) 166 F. (2d) 971; concurring opinion of Judge Frank
in Standard Brands v. Smidler, (2d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 34 at 37; Majestic Mfg. Co. v.
Majestic Electric Appliance Co., (D.C. Ohio 1948) 79 F. Supp. 649. See also Foreword
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monopoly" thinking has recently been allowed to spill over illogically
into the commercial identity field. 4
A view of the panorama reveals that many courts seem almost to
be searching for reasons to deny relief in trade identit:y5 cases, under
the mistaken impression that to grant it would lift from the public
domain something which is clearly the property of all.
Yet, is not the public interest best served by maintenance of the
by Brainerd Currie to ''Trade-Marks in Transition,'' 14 LAw
(1949).

AND

CoNTEM.

PROB.

171

4 The restrictionist views of Sigmund Timberg appear in ''Trade-Marks, Monopoly
and Restraint of Competition," 14 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 323 (1949). At p. 333 he
summarizes:
"In retrospect, therefore, trade-marks, in addition to their role as facilitating or enforcement mechanisms for competitive restraints independently desired by private parties, may
directly promote restraint of trade. Thus, for example, trade-marks may on occasion be the
direct vehicles whereby monopoly power is consciously brought to bear on actual or potential competitors. Furthermore, protagonists of classical competitive theory urge that trademarks undermine the proper basis of competition contemplated by the anti-trust laws, because the demand for a trade-marked commodity persists and is inelastic, regardless of what
is attempted by would-be competitors in the way of ordinary price competition. In other
cases, owners of trade-marks or trade names become unconscious, albeit willing, monopolists
because the trade-marks or names are indispensable means of describing commodities in the
market place. It may well be that these direct, and perhaps often unintended, consequences
of the use of the trade-mark are socially more important than the positive and purposive use
of trade-marks to abet illegal conspiracies. Allied with these considerations is the fact that
the functioning of the trade-mark system may place small business at a great relative disadvantage compared with big business, and may thereby promote the concentration of economic power in this country faster than antitrust proceedings in the trade-mark field can
dissipate such concentration."
But for Rogers contra, see: ''The Lanham Act and the Social Function of TradeMarks," 14 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 173 at 176 (1949): ''Identification of business and
goods is the essence of free competition and the opposite of monopoly."
See also the views of Zlinkoff, "Monopoly Versus Competition, Significant Trends in
Patent, Anti-Trust, Trade-Mark, and Unfair Competition Suits," 53 YALE L.J. 514 at 531
(1944):
''The trend of decisions within this field during the past decade-in contrast to that
which prevailed in the preceding period-has unmistakably been moving towards restricting
the scope of exclusive rights awarded plaintiffs and correspondingly broadening the privileges of their competitors. The influence of the Shredded Wheat case, plus the effect of
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in a large number of cases where the results
reached by the circuit courts were in harmony with the Court's views on the central problem of monopoly versus competition have served to mold and accelerate this trend. With
increasing consistency the circuit courts have rendered judgments for defendants, reversing
district courts' rulings awarding relief to plaintiffs, and restricting and casting doubt on
their own decisions in the earlier decade. Examination of all the circuit court cases in this
field reveals that the number in favor of the defendants greatly preponderates. And in view
of the great importance to the consuming public and the commercial world of these results,
the repeated denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court-which at the same time tends to
create these results-may be accounted for only by the fact that they were in accord with
the Court's views on monopoly and competition."
Ii The phrases "trade identification,'' "commercial identity,'' "trade identity," et cetera,
are employed throughout this article to refer to matters and the law which have customarily
been described as "trade-marks, trade names and unfair competition." It is suggested that
such phraseology as "the law of trade identification" best describes the field, and that its
mere use alone would tend to alleviate some of the mislaid emphasis discussed herein.
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sanctity of the means for individual identification in trade; for how
can a strong competitive economy function without clear cut lines
of identification? Is it not contradictory to seek protection for business against the evils of monopoly, and by doing so, in effect, to communize by court decision their means for maintaining their own
identity in commerce? But, this appears to be the current trend in
many jurisdictions. Perhaps the contradiction has been largely fostered by a mistaken approach of the bar. Perhaps it sterns principally
from confusion of trade identification law with that of patents or copyrights,6 to which it actually bears no logical relation.

II
The continued raising of the standards of commercial ethics, hopefully referred to by Mr. Rogers in 1914, stemmed from the days of
lex mercatoria and the great guilds of the middle-ages, each mastercraftsman of which was required to have his own individual mark,
the jealously guarded seal of the quality of his craftsmanship. Likewise, the origins of our law of commercial identification are traced
largely to the common law of England, as with those of most of our
commercial law. With the increase in business intercourse following
the industrial revolution in England and the conquering of the wilderness in America, the necessity for protection from and suppression
of confusion of trade names, symbols, and marks expanded correspondingly.
Without product and source identification, competition became
impossible when the shoes made by John Smith ceased to be purchased always by his acquaintances and from him personally. Unless
the shoes which John made bore some identifying mark or name to
serve as a connecting link between him and his trade, his goods had
either to be sold only locally, or simply as a staple. Without such a
connecting link, his reputation's value was limited to sales from his
own shop. Sometimes even local sale did not solve the problem, as
when another John Smith opened a shoe shop in the same village or
community. The demand developed accordingly for sanction and
support by the courts for the system of trade identity which necessarily
arose to permit individual competition and free enterprise on an ever
broadening scale. Upon this system there developed our modern,
competitive, national market economy. Without the system, and a
6 See: Lunsford, ''Woe Unto You Trade-Mark Owners,'' 49 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1103
(1951). And for a discussion and distinction between patents, copyrights and trade-marks
see: Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., (6th Cir. 1941) 119 F.
(2d) 316 at 323; reversed but only as to the measure of profits and damages, 316 U.S. 203,
62 S.Ct. 1022 (1942); Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 at 368, 44 S.Ct. 350 (1924).
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gradually increasing protection afforded it by the courts, this economy
could not have grown to a magnitude which is the envy of the world.
Deprived of the sanction and protection, it must suffer correspondingly.
As the number of trade-marks and trade names in use in the nineteenth century increased, it became necessary to obtain some measure
of order out of the multiplicity, and a system of registration with the
government evolved both in this country and abroad. Perhaps for
reasons of economy, or perhaps from sheer unfortunate misunderstanding (witness The Trade Mark Cases7 ), the administration of the
registration system was illogically relegated to the governmental patent
offices.
Both patents and copyrights -are, of course, limited statutory
monopolies, granted to encourage the inventive and creative arts and
sciences under the conviction that the public interest is thus best
served. Obviously, there is no public interest served in granting a
monopoly for the creation or invention of a new, unique, ingenious
or attractive trade-mark or trade name. 8 Obviously, any such grant
would contravene the public interest. The law in this :field can have
but one objective compatible with the public interest-the maintenance
of individual identity in trade. The bene:6.ts of achieving this objective are twofold: :first, the consumer is assured of getting the product
he wants; second, the merchant is assured of the fruits of his labor,
the bene:6.ts of his good will, the results of his enterprise (be it good
or bad), and the ability to compete with otht::rs in terms of his own
reputation, his own products, and his own private identity. A consideration of these fundamentals reveals that basically it is the intangible thing, the individual identity, which must be protected-as
may be necessary-not any individual word or mark, as such, which is
relied upon to achieve that identity.

III
There seem always to be those whose inclinations are to reap where
they have not sown and to ride as long as possible on the coat-tails
of the diligent and successful; and since the ingenuity of the "freerider" has developed in proportion to the value of the ride, the courts
have been constantly beset with difficulties in achieving the objective
7 United States v. Steffens; United States v. Wittemann; United States v. Johnson,
100 U.S. 82 (1879).
s See: Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., (6th Cir. 1941)
119 F. (2d) 316 at 323, reversed but only as to the measure of damages, 316 U.S. 203
(1943); e.g. Ambrosia Chocolate Co. v. Ambrosia Cake Bakery, (4th Cir. 1947) 165 F.
(2d) 693 at 697: "Only upon a clear showing of novelty and originality approximating a
'Bash of genius' is a patent granted; while a man of ordinary intelligence could easily devise
a score of valid trade-marks in a short period of time."
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mentioned above9 even when it has been recognized rather than
obscured by the superficial reasoning so prevalent in this field. In
relatively recent years it was :finally comprehended and accepted that
"unfair competition" could exist where actual "competition" itself was
absent.10 Also within recent years there appeared a vast expansion
of commercial enterprise implemented by such developments as: selfservice stores, national advertising, the radio, and now, television.
These, and many other innovations which stress commercial identification, augmented a national market economy and with it enhanced
the values of the free ride on a national reputation. But coincident
with this evolution there appeared the evils of the vast corporate
monopolies, and, in counter-balance, the anti-monopoly philosophy
as now evidenced in the judicial, executive and legislative branches
of the government, and in current economic and political philosophy.
Almost precisely at this point the contradiction made its appearance,
an understandable contradiction, perhaps, but a dangerous one wholly
in error in its reasoning and destructive in its results. In the rush
to destroy the monopolies that were stilling commercial competition,
and with it the initiative which had made the nation great, the very
means and basis· for this competition and individual initiative has
suffered and is now being undermined. Business concerns now often
:find, when in court seeking simply to prevent encroachments upon their
individual identity, and thus, their good will, that they are accused
of striving to preserve unto themselves a monopoly in words and symbols which were and are the heritage of all. In recent years the
courts have often confused themselves and confounded the public and
the businessman by prescribing impossibly artificial standards and
yardsticks in resolving trade-mark and unfair competition cases-yardsticks the measure of which seems to depend upon whether certain
words, devices, colors, or combinations thereof consist of elements
which are a part of the language or the public domain.11 The rule
9Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 131 at 150: "My
reading in the literature has covered hundreds of cases dealing with many subjects pertaining to trade-mark infringement and unfair competition. The experts in the field have been
hard put to work out a scheme among the multiple decisions. Instance after instance may
be cited where decisional results are patently incompatible. A pattern of logic has failed
to result, I believe, because each decision is controlled by its particular facts. This type of
litigation presents fact cases. This makes it difficult to apply precedents which are conclusive. The soundness of any particular court's decision is controlled by the fidelity of the
application of established legal principles to a particular set of facts for adjudication."
10 See: 2 NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, 4th ed., §374, pp. 11941206 (1947).
11£.g., Dixie Cola Laboratories v. Coca-Cola Co., (4th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 352;
Philco Corp. v. F. & B. Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 958 at 961: "A distinctive
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has been stated frequently that where a word or device is an ordinary
one which is the property of all, it may not be granted as a monopoly
to any one trader, and therefore, no one trader can be protected against
simulating use by another.12
In Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd.13 Judge Frank
stated that the legal protection of trade names "creates lawful monopolies, immunities from competition." Yet without the identifying
device of trade names or trade-marks how can effective competition
exist? In Sunbeam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam Corporation,1 4 speaking
of the trade-mark Sunbeam, the court stated:
"... it seems quite unreasonable to hold that the plaintiff company with its well-earned reputation for quality in its line should
have the legally enforceable monopoly to this superlative term
throughout the whole electrical world. . . .
"If, in course of our free enterprise, someone would market an
mark or name will be broadly protected as a trade-mark, but general words or names, which
have been applied to and used and registered as trade-marks for a large number and variety
of products, will be protected only within the range of use on similar goods. Pease v. Scott
County Milling Co., D.C. Mo., 5 F. 2d 524." Sunbeam Corp. v. Sunbeam Lighting Co.,
(9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 969.
12 Nims, in UNFAIR CoMPBnTION AND TRADB-MARKs, 4th ed., states, however, at p.
525: "Present day protection of trade-marks is assailed also as encouraging monopoly. That
word is over-worked. Its history has given it a suggestion of illegality and undesirability
which renders it almost useless to convey accurately ideas which it often intended to express, There are far more monopolies that are useful and in the public interest than those
that are not. Literally it means to sell alone-to be the exclusive seller. Its extended meaning is as the name of any exclusive right or property of which there are scores that are
known to us all. Applied to trade-marks, it means rights in a word, in a particular connection which are exclusive to the owner. The word 'bluebird' is in the public domain. No
one can monopolize it, as applied to birds; but exclusive-monopolistic if you please-rights
may exist in it as a trade-mark. Hence to say that a trade-mark is a monopoly often creates
an erroneous impression as something contrary to public interest. A trade-mark consists of
an exclusive right to use a name to indicate source in a particular field of industry. It may
serve in addition, as the name of the goods of a particular concern. Both uses are exclusive
privileges-monopolies if you will-but not illegal ones; nor are they against public policy,
unless it is no longer of benefit to merchants or to consumers for goods to be so marked that
their maker or seller may be identified." But in 26 N.C.L. RBv. 139 at 168-169 (1948),
Wallace C. Murchison in commenting upon the "monopolistic" tobacco industry, suggested:
"One of the thorniest aspects of dissolution in the tobacco industry would be disposition of
trade-marks and brand names; perhaps use of present brand names by any of the newly
created corporations would be the only practical solution. • • • Restriction of this protective
device of monopoly [brands] offers the only hope for the evolution of a tobacco industry
of many producers and effective competition." See also: Borchardt, "Are Trade-Marks an
Anti-Trust Problem?" 31 GBo. L.J. 245 (1943); Diggins, "Trade-Marks and Restraints of
Trade,'' 32 GBo. L.J. 113 (1944); Lockhart, ''ViolatioD1 of the Anti-Trust Laws as a
Defense in Civil Actions," 31 MINN. L. RBv. 507 at 564 (1947).
13 (2d Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 955 at 957, cert. den. 320 U.S. 758, 64 S.Ct. 65
(1943).
14 (9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 969 at 973 and 972, cert. den. 340 U.S. 920, 71 S.Ct.
357 (1951).
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unworthy article outside plaintiff's field bearing the name Sunbeam it must be borne as not an unlikely circumstance following
plaintiff's selection of a non-fanciful word popular with commercial concerns." 15

In California Fruit Growers Exchange

11.

Sunkist Baking Co.,1 6

we find:
"The unconscionable efforts of the plaintiffs to monopolize
the food market by the monopoly of the word 'Sunkist' on all
manner of goods sold in the usual food stores should not be sanctioned by the courts."

Yet, even were the plaintiff to have been granted a "patent" on
the word "Sunkist," it would hardly have been able to "monopolize
the food market," for it would still have been faced with the competition of concerns using such well received trade-marks as Swift's, Libby's,
Monarch, Quaker, and a host of others.·
In denying relief in Majestic Mfg. Co. 11. Majestic Electric Appliance Co.,1 7 the court stated:
"The granting of greater protection would create a monopolistic power not contemplated in the law relating to trade-mark
rights ....
"The allocation of the entire field of household appliances to
plaintiff under the trade-mark 'Majestic' would be tantamount to
a gift of exclusive ownership of the use of an English word."
Many courts and counsel have likewise drawn from time to time
upon the ill-conceived statement of the Supreme Court in American
Steel Foundries 11. Robertson18 respecting the trade-mark Simplex and
other commonly used marks:
"It would be a serious matter if the law actually permitted anyone who chose to do so to organize a series of corporations with
names containing these words, respectively, and thereupon virtually withdraw these words from public use as trade-marks and
monopolize them by preventing their registry as such."
The Court was, of course, referring to the so-called "name clause"
15 See also, Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., (9th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d)
141. But in contrast are the opinions of different panels of the same court in Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, (9th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 348 and Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Dunnell, (9th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 649.
1a (7th Cir. 1947) 166 F. (2d) 971 at 974.
11 (D.C. Ohio 1948) 79 F. Supp. 649 at 650.
1s 269 U.S. 372 at 384, 46 S.Ct. 160 (1926).
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provisions of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 prohibiting the registration
of trade-marks which substantially appropriated a corporate name.19
But its concern that such a device would "monopolize" the words involved was wholly unjustified, since it had been held repeatedly that
registration under that act conferred no substantive rights; thus the
barring of registration could confer no monopoly.20 When it is remembered that trade-mark rights spring only from use and are limited
by the extent or area of the likelihood of confusion which might arise
from simulating use, it is clear that the Court's fears were ungrounded.
It is noteworthy, moreover, that the "name clause" provisions were
not included in the present statute, the Trade-Mark Act of 1946.
Perhaps the foremost judicial exponent of the "monopoly" notion
is Judge Jerome Frank of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. In the Eastern Wine Case21 he spoke for the majority
and expressed the convictions which have reappeared22 in all of his
recent opinions in trade identification cases:
19 Sec.

5, Trade-Mark Act of February 20, 1905 (Repealed July 5, 1946).
Walgreen Drug Stores v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., (8th Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d)
956 at 960: "Mere registration under the Federal Act does not create a trade-mark and
confers no new rights to the mark claimed, nor, indeed, any greater rights than already
existed at common law without registration. United States Printing & Lithograph Co. v.
Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279 U.S. 156, 49 S.Ct. 267, 73 L.Ed. 650; In re Plymouth Motor
Corp., Cust. & Pat. App., 46 F. 2d 211; Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 44 S.Ct.
350, 68 L.Ed. 731."
21 (2d Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 955 at 957.
2 2 See his concurring opinion in Standard Brands v. Smidler, (2d Cir. 1945) 151 F.
(2d) 34, which was concluded at p. 43 with: ''I would not, however, be sorry jf the
Supreme Court reversed our decision"; and which reads at p. 38: ''With considerable
doubt, I agree with my colleagues, in holding that plaintiff has such a monopoly. I shall
canvass in some detail the reasons for my doubts because they touch the trunk nerve of the
trade-name doctrine, a doctrine which, I think, has been left in much obscurity. I use the
word 'monopoly' advisedly, because basic in the consideration of cases like this is the fact
that judicial protection of any trade name necessarily involves a legalized monopoly which
does not-like patents, copyrights or public utility monopolies-rest upon any statute but
is entirely judge-made. In the inception of the trade-name doctrine, that fact went largely
unobserved." In Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, (2d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 969 at
982, Judge Frank dissented and argued as follows: ''Without doubt, the judge-made tradename doctrine or concept fosters monopolies; and, generally speaking, the common-law
tradition is inimical to monopolies (although opposition to monopoly when it takes the form
of an obsessive monopoly-phobia becomes absurd). Some writers, disturbed by the suggestion that judicially-protected trade-names are monopolies, protest that the judicial protection
of trade-names rests on prevention of unfairness between competitors, not on protection of
monopoly. But, no matter by what doctrinal path the courts arrive at their results in this
6eld, the judicial restraints of defendants do yield plaintiffs' monopolies. To the practical,
social consequences of their decisions, the courts ought not shut their eyes. A concept is
what it does. If a legal concept produces a monopoly, the concept, pragmatically, is a concept favoring monopoly. Such a concept should be carefully scrutinized when the courts are
asked to widen it, as here, by a decision which will become a precedent with 'radiating
potencies.' "
20 E.g.,

0
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"On oral argument, plaintiff's counsel contended that the
alleged confusion resulting from the alleged similarity of the
names was injurious to consumers. That contention embodies
a frequently encountered misunderstanding of the doctrine of
'unfair competition,' a misunderstanding which has led to those
instances of undue extension of the ~doctrine on which plaintiff
relies. Much of that misunderstanding seems to stem from the
misleading use of the word 'competition' in the label 'unfair
competition.' For, while competition has been cherished in part
on the ground that it fosters character traits in competing businessmen deemed socially valuable, its basic virtue is generally
regarded as consisting of its benefits to consumers. The magna
carta of competition, Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations,
made it clear that the consumer's interests were to be the dominant aim of the competitive system: 'Consumption,' wrote Adam
Smith, 'is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it
may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The
maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it would be absurd to
attempt to prove it.' But the legal protection of trade-names does
not engender competition; on the contrary, it creates lawful
monopolies, immunities from competition. And the legally forbidden invasions of those monopolies might often benefit consumers. Thus, if a competitor of the manufacturer of a toothpaste with an established trade-name were to sell that identical
toothpaste under that name but at half the usual price, the consuming public would be better off .financially; nevertheless such
competition would, of course, be enjoined."
Judge Frank continues with a stimulating discussion of the true place
and value of monopolies in an economically competitive society. All
of his reasoning, however, seems falsely postulated from what is
assumed as a self-evident fact-that protecting trade-marks "creates
lawful monopolies, immunities from competition."
The recent decision in Creamette Company v. Conlin et al. 23
denied relief to the complainant, prior user of the mark Creamette
for macaroni, against trade-mark and trade name use of Creamette
for ice cream products. Although confusion may or may not have
been likely, the court bottomed its decision on the lack of evidence of
intent to defraud and the following anti-monopoly reasoning:
'We think it true that a name may be arbitrary or fanciful
as applied to one or more products, but yet not be entitled to
unlimited protection as against its good faith trade name adop2s (5th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 108 at 112.
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tion and use upon a product of which, because of its inherent
properties, it is plainly and accurately descriptive in ordinary
meaning. As applied to such an article it is a nonfanciful word
because as thus used it is descriptive. Such a situation is analogous to that considered in Sunbeam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam
Corp., 9 Cir., 183 F. 2d 969. This statement may be only
another way of expressing the well established rule in such cases
that even a 'strong' trade name does not grant a monopoly for
unlimited use, Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., supra; Arrow
Distilleries v. Globe Brewing Co., 4 Cir., 117 F. 2d 347, 351.
In any event, what is sufficient to control this case is the conclusion that the appellant's trade and corporate name Creamette
is not so all inclusive as to give the broad monopoly for its use
which is necessary to legally require a :finding that, in the circumstances here and where no actual or legal fraud is shown,
the use of the term on a frozen sweet or dessert product like
ice cream is an act of unfair competition which equity should
enjoin." 24
It is obvious from these and other somewhat less emphatic but
correspondingly destructive pronouncements that the rule is rapidly
becoming fixed as follows: Where a trade-mark is an ordinary word
or symbol the "patent" or "copyright" monopoly will be treated as
"narrow," if existent at all, and protection against the use of similar
words on identical goods or identical words on similar goods, or other
ingenious efforts to trade upon the good will of the prior user, will
be limited or denied accordingly. The test then becomes more a
question of the semantic understandings of the particular court hearing the controversy, with the chaos and contradiction that must inevitably How therefrom, than an adjudication of the single fact question actually involved. That question is wholly encompassed, however, by the test which the courts have long since evolved and which
2 4 Interesting to note is the following contradiction found in the two "Philco" cases in
the Seventh Circuit: ''But 'Philco' is neither a geographical term nor an abbreviation suggesting a geographical term; it is a coined word unquestionably subject to exclusive appropriation under the 1905 common laws of the States, and therefore under the Act of 1905."
Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 663 at 673. Yet in Philco
Corp. v. F & B Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 958 we read atp. 961, as a reason
for denial of relief against an alleged infringement of ''Philco": "A distinctive mark or name
will be broadly protected as a trade-mark, but general words or names, which have been
applied to and used and registered as trade-marks for a large number and variety of products, will be protected only within the range of use on similar goods." And still later, in
the same court's opinion in Jewel Tea Co. v. Kraus, 187 F. (2d) 278 (1950), appears the
statement at p. 282: "On the other hand 'Jewel' is not a coined or fanciful name, such as
'Kodak,' 'Philco' or 'Budweiser.' " It is also amusing to note that ''Budweiser" is not fanciful but is a geographical name, as was stressed in Anheuser-Busch v. Du Bois Brewing Co.,
(3d Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 370 at 371.
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is a sound and reliable determinant appropriate to virtually all trade
identification controversies. Its application will result in minimum
contradiction and maximum protection for the public and private
interest. It has been incorporated into the statute,25 and in essence
it is: If the use by the subsequent trader is likely to result in confusion with the goods, service or reputation of the prior user, it should
not be permitted. 26
With such a test there is no need for inquiry into whether the
mark in issue is an ordinary word, such as "Ivory," an invented one,
such as "Kodak," or any word or mark in between. What the law
need protect is the right to individual identity, not the word or mark
which, when used in a certain highly finite way, is the means for
achieving it. For the law to concern itself with the nature of the
word or mark in any way other than to inquire as to the likelihood of
confusion is to place the cart before the horse. In a trade-mark or
similar case no court is ever required to make any academic determination of whether the mark involved is a part of the public property.
It need have no fear that in protecting a trade-mark a monopoly may
be granted in anything that is public property so long as it adheres
to the likelihood of confusion test.
As an extreme example, it is obvious that no merchant could expect to identify beer, manufactured or sold by him, merely by any
use of the word ''beer" as his trade-mark. Obviously, those who
might buy his beer could not be misled by any use of the word ''beer"
by another into believing that they were purchasing the product of
the first. Hence there is no area for likelihood of confusion, and
it could not be shown. Hence, protection for the use of ''beer" as
a trade-mark for beer would be denied. But if the word ''beer" does
function to the trade and public to identify a particular brand of
merchandise, for instance, a particular brand of soap, the user should
be protected, within the limits of likelihood of confusion, from subsequent use by another despite the fact that the word ''beer" is an
25 Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. L. 437, §32(1),
2 6 See also: 3 TonTs R:asTATl!MllNT §730, comment b:

15 U.S.C. (1946) §1114(1).
"The interest [in a trade-mark
or a trade name] is not protected against the use of a similar designation for any goods,
services or business. It is protected only within the limits fixed by the likelihood of confusion of prospective purchasers. The issue in each case is whether the goods, services or
businesses . • • are sufficiently related so that the alleged infringement would subject the
good-will and reputation of the other's trade-mark or trade name to the hazards of the
actor's business."

1952]

TRADE-MARKS .AND THE

MONOPOLY PHOBIA

979

ordinary one, is a part of the language, and is openly available to
the use of all.
Protection within the limits of likelihood of confusion can never
inhibit the right of anyone to use the ordinary word involved in any
sense other than as a means for source of goods identification. Insomuch as an ordinary word, when used in a particular way (i.e. as a
trade-mark), serves to identify a particular product as coming from
a particular source, that much should its corresponding use by others
be denied. In other words, to the extent that its corresponding use
by others is likely to result in confusion of source with the prior
user, that much the prior user's individual trade identity should be
protected and use denied to another-no more, no less. The mark,
whatever it may be, is unimportant. It is only a means to an end,
the end being the worthy one of identification for the public of merchandise or service with source and thus connecting and preserving
good will to its rightful owner. It is not the mark, it is the result of
the prior use that is significant.27
An excellent delineation of the elements of the law of trade-marks
and a distinction of it from that of patent monopolies is found in
Judge Freed's opinion in United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.28
"Trade marks in our economic system provide the method by
which one seller may be enabled to distinguish his goods from
those of another. Fundamentally the basic function of the law
pertaining to trade marks is to safeguard the good will of one
manufacturer or distributor against the sale of another's merchandise as his. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 80 U.S. 311,
20 L. Ed. 581, Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 36 S. Ct. 357, 60 L.Ed. 713. The right to protect it is bestowed by the law not O_?o/ to reward business enterprise and
prevent piracy on successful and established ventures, but at the
2 7 See: Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., (7th Cir. 1913) 208 F.
513 at 516: "It is not the trade-mark, but the trade, the business reputation, and good will,
that is injured; and the property or right in the trade is protected from injury by preventing
a fraud-doer from stealing the complainant's trade by means of using the complainant's
'commercial signature.' " And at p. 5\ 7: "Othexs may use the common word in its common
meaning, but they cannot use it in the particular meaning created by the complainant."
Also Professor Chafee's article, "Coming Into Equity with Clean Hands," 47 MICH, L.
REv. 1065 at 1078 (1949): "... what is basically safeguarded in trade-mark cases is the
market, not the mark. . . . The trade-mark is the means by which A strengthens his expectancy of drawing customers to his door."
28 (D.C. Ohio 1949) 83 F. Supp. 284 at 315; Modified, but not as to the above, 341
U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 125, 530 (1951).
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same time to prevent deception of the public into believing that
they are purchasing one product instead of another.
"The trade mark right as all other rights is not without
bounds. The owner's rights are canalized within the exercise of
the trade mark's accepted and defined functions. The law is
replete with decisions which set out their functions and limitations.
"Some of them are lucidly delineated in United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98, 39 S. Ct. 48, 50,
63 L.Ed. 141, as follows:
'The asserted doctrine is based upon the fundamental error
of supposing that a trade-mark right is a right in gross or at
large, like a statutory copyright or a patent for an invention, to
either of which, in truth, it has little or no analogy. Canal
Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 3ll, 322, 20 L.Ed. 581; McLean v.
Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254, 24 L.Ed. 828. There is no such
thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant
to an established business or trade in connection with which
the mark is employed. The law of trade-marks is but a part
of the broader law of unfair competition; the right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its
function is simply to designate the goods as the product bf
a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale
of another's product as his; and it is not the subject of property
except in connection with an existing business. Hanover
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-414, 36 S. Ct.
357, 60 L. Ed. 713.
'The owner of a trade-mark may not, like the proprietor
of a patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly. See United States v. LAmerican] Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250, 17 S. Ct. 809,
42 L.Ed. 144; Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S.
70, 90, 22 S. Ct. 747, 46 L. Ed. 1058; [Continental] Paper Bag
Patent Case, 210 U.S. 405, 424, 28 S. Ct. 748, 52 L.Ed. 1122.
'In truth, a trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in
a proper sense, but is merely a convenient means for facilitating
the protection of one's good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol-a commercial signature-upon
the merchandise or the package in which it is sold.' " 29
29 See: Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Raymond, (C.C. ill. 1895) 70 F. 376 at 383:
"The use of this word [Royal] in good faith by any person for any purpose of oral or
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Although more recent opinions indicate some amendment in his
views,30 the language of Judge Learned Hand in Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson31 in describing the nature of trade identification
rights can hardly be improved:
"However, it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark
outside the field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by
a court. His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the
goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another
uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer
lies within his own control. This is an injury, even though the
borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a
reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator,
and another can use it only as a mask. And so it has come to be
recognized that, unless the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure against any identification of the two, it is unlawful. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney, 247 F. 407 (C.C.A. 2)
L.R.A. 1918C, 1039; Akron-Overland v. Willys-Overland, 273 F.
674 (C.C.A. 3); Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F.
509 (C.C.A. 6); Wall v. Rolls-Royce, 4 F. (2d) 333 (C.C.A. 3)."
A particularly penetrating and learned rebuttal to arguments of
those who imagine that protecting trade identification rights fosters
unwarranted monopoly is found in Professor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim's article, "The Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial
and Intellectual Property."32 He states:
"Unlike patents and copyrights, trade-marks and trade names
are not the creatures of statutory grant ·of exclusiveness based upon
written communication, descriptively or metaphorically, is not invaded by the trade-mark
function which this complainant's peculiar use of said word has added to it•••• But I
think the analogy of a patent right or of an estate in land, sometimes followed in reasonings
about trade-marks, is false and misleading." And in Willson v. Graphol Products Co.,
(C.C. P.A. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 498 at 501-502: "A trade-mark is not a grant, does not
spring up through registration as do patents and copyrights, but is a right growing out of
use." Also holding that trade-mark rights are not monopoly rights is Philadelphia Storage
Battery Co. v. Mindling, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N.Y.S. 176 at 181 (1937).
80 E.g., S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, (2d Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 427; S. C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, (2d Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 176; Federal Telephone &
Badio Corp. v. Federal Television Corp., (2d Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 250.
81 (2d Cir. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 972 at 974.
82 40 T.M. REP. 613 at 622 (1950). See also, Baker, ''The Monopoly Concept of
Trade-Marks and Trade Names and the 'Free Ride' Theory of Unfair Competition," 17
GEo. WASH, L. Rllv. 112 (1948).
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specific constitutional sanction. They are primarily the creatures
of the common law and are also protected under registration statutes. The Trade-Mark Act of 1946 purports to introduce some
new substantive rights of trade-mark owners going beyond the
common law.
"Under our jurisprudence, common law protection arises from
adoption and use of either arbitrary or suggestive terms-the socalled technical marks-or descriptive and geographical terms,
personal names and the like which have become associated in the
public mind with a particular source - the so-called secondary
meaning trade names.
"It is elementary that. these marks are symbols of good will
which serve the essential commercial purpose of identifying the
product and source of one merchant's goods and distinguishing
them from the goods of his competitors."33
He then refers to the "restrictionists" and the rules of decency which
seem to be fast disappearing into the mists of monopoly thinking:
"In short, the conventional judicial doctrine is that the public
interest lies in preventing competition through infringement of
the plaintiff's trade-marks by defendant's use of an identical or
confusingly similar mark in order that the competitive struggle
might be conducted on a plane of fair competitive rivalry.
'What's wrong with that classical concept of the public interest? Does it not square with the American sense of 'fair play,' a
belief imbedded in the folkways of the sports arena and the market
place?
"Again the restrictionists enter the picture with the theme that
the public interest has beeri neglected in the failure of the courts
to be alerted to the peril that the exclusiveness of trade-mark rights
might be worth less than they cost society. As in the case of patents, the restrictionists argue for a strict judicial attitude in ruling
on the validity of trade-marks and on the scope of their protection.
They have questioned the basic premises of the traditional theory
of trade-mark protection. This time, they have labeled trade-marks
as 'partial monopolies' incompatible with the preservation of competitive opportunities of other businessmen. . . .
"Except in times of war or national emergency, American industrialists and businessmen should have the final say in managerial decisions concerning what to produce, how to produce, how
to market and at what price to sell. Consumers should have fre~
33 40

T.M.

REP.

613 at 622 (1950).

1952]

TRADE-MARKS AND THE MONOPOLY PHOBIA

983

choices in their preferences for goods and services as umpires in
the compentive order.
"In these days, it is more necessary than ever that we should be
constantly alert to preserve such a conception of our legal system
and economy."34
Perhaps it should be mentioned that it can be wrongly argued that
the likelihood of confusion doctrine would, if pursued to its ultimate,
logically permit the large and powerful to appropriate the mark of the
weak and insignificant prior user merely by weight of an advertising
and promotion campaign which would result in educating the public
to believe that the products bearing a given mark originate with the
subsequent rather than the prior user. It is true that under such circumstances the subsequent user could show that he suffered from such
confusion; but the prior user could always show that as to his own,
though limited, customers he had been defrauded, and this would ·
justify his and his trade's relief and the enjoining of the subsequent
user.
When it is understood that the protection which should be afforded
in the law of commercial identification runs not to particular words,
marks or designs but actually to an intangible right to maintain one's
identity inviolate, it seems clear that consideration of monopolies akin
to patents or copyrights has no place.

IV
5

The laws of forgery3 or counterfeiting are perhaps more closely
allied to that of commercial identification than are any other branches.
A forgery is a making or altering of a writing or instrument which, if
genuine, would, or on its face might, be of some legal effect upon the
rights of others. If John A. Smith forges the signature of another John
34 Id. at 623. But see, contra: "The Extension of Trade-Mark Protection to Non·
Competitive Relationships," 44 !I.I.. L. REv. 182 (1949). See also, Brown, "Advertising
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols," 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948);
and, contra, Hilson Co. v. Foster, (C.C. N.Y. 1897) 80 F. 896 at 897.
35 See, e.g.: ''While it is true that every man has a right to use his own name in his
own business, it is also true that he has no right to use it for the purpose of stealing the
good will of his neighbor's business, nor to commit a fraud upon his neighbor, nor a tres·
pass upon his neighbor's rights or property; and, while it is true that every man has a right
to use white paper, it is also true that he has no right to use it for making counterfeit
money, nor to commit a forgery. It might as well be set up, in defense of a highwayman,
that, because the constitution secures to every man the right to bear arms, he had a constitutional right to rob his victim at the muzzle of a rille or revolver." Garrett v. T. H. Garrett & Co., (6th Cir. 1896) 78 F. 472 at 478.
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A. Smith upon a check, it is a crime. It is no less a crime that John A.
Smith, the forger, has all freedom in the right to use his own name.
The only limitation upon that right is that he may not use tt in any way
likely to confuse his own individual identity with that of another.
Obviously there is no monopoly right involved in this question. Neither
of these John A. Smiths has any monopoly in the name John A. Smith,
as a glance at a telephone directory will reveal. Yet, without question,
the individuality of all John A. Smiths will be protected against a
forgery which feloniously invades the individual identity of any one
of them. The forgery mentione~ imitates a particular and :finite identifying use of that ordinary name in a way likely to deceive as to identity. The infringer of an ordinary word used as a trade-mark imitates
a particular and :finite identifying use of an ordinary word which may
otherwise be freely used by all. The analogy is complete, and the rights
involved are not "monopolies," as such, in words or names. Even the
rights of third parties or the public for protection against forgeries and
protection against invasions of trade identity are perfectly analogous.
Thus it appears that protection of the identifying function of trademarks, symbols, names and the like within the scope or area of a likelihood of confusion is only protecting the merchant and the public from
the likelihood of trade forgery. 36
There is but one difference in the two :fields of law. For forgery
the intent to deceive is requisite, the act being a criminal one. In the
law of trade identi:6.cation, the cause of action being civil in nature, the
element of intent may be absent, since the damage of confusion may
result either with or without the intent to defraud. 37
36 Interesting are the views of the prominent political and business £gure, James
A. Farley: "A trade-mark is a simple practical device-a commercial invention of the
fust order. In the millions of daily transactions of buying and selling it is a symbol of an
implied contractual relationship between buyer and seller that establishes the identity and
responsibility of merchandise. It fixes identity and responsibility much in the same manner
as your own signature at the bottom of a letter makes you its responsible author. • . • In
the long run no product sells because of advertising that would not have sold in a lesser
degree without it. For if the product is not worthy, advertising simply hastens the day
when the whole market has sampled the product and rejected it. Advertising cannot make
a permanent success of any product that is not £t for success on its own. Thus, advertising
is a multiplier that broadcasts your virtues-or your defects-all the faster." "Advertising
As A World Force," an address to the Advertising Club of New York, THI! CocA CoLA
BoTI'LER, (July 1949) p. 49.
37 Several state trade-mark statutes, however, contain criminal provisions for trademark infringement where the intent to defraud is present. Judge Learned Hand stated in
My-T Fine Corp. v. Samuels, (2d Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 76 at 77: "We need not say
whether that intent is always a necessary element in such causes of suit; probably it originally was in federal courts. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 24 L.Ed. 828; Lawrence
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V
Perhaps an early and unfortunate choice was the use of the word
"infringement" to describe a simulating use of a previously used trademark. The law of trade-marks is constantly and properly said to be
''but a part of the broader law of unfair competition." Unfair competition is often aptly described as the genus and trade-mark infringement one of its species.38 Both causes of action arise from the same
fact situations and are frequently pleaded together. It being clear
that they are ''birds of a feather" not akin to rights in patents or copyrights, it is curious and contradictory that the word "infringement"
has been borrowed from the diverse fields of patent and copyright
law and applied to describe the misuse of trade-marks. Demonstrative
of the ineptitude is the fact that the word "infringement" is almost
never used to describe acts of the "genus," unfair competition. It is
applied only to the "species," namely trade-mark misuse.
Perhaps this semantic inaccuracy contributes to the misconceptions, contradictions and inequities which seem to lie in so many
recent trade identity decisions. As mentioned, it seems finally to have
been accepted that the words "unfair competition" should not be read
literally, and that unfair competition can, and often does, exist where
competition itself is absent. The trend is the other way, however, as
to the word "infringement," and the illogical approach which it connotes appears ever in ascendance.

VI
Another possible source of contradiction and error, closely allied to
the "monopoly" and "infringement" notions, lies in the customary use
Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, II S.Ct. 396, 34 L.Ed. 997; Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 21 S.Ct. 270, 45 L.Ed. 365.
But when it appears, we think that it has an important procedural result; a late comer who
deliberately copies the dress of his competitors already in the field, must at least prove
that his effort has been futile. Prima facie the court will treat his opinion so disclosed as
expert and will not assume that it was erroneous. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell Mfg. Co.,
77 F. 869, 877 (C.C. A. 2); Capewell Horse Nail Co. v. Green, 188 F. 20, 24 (C.C.A. 2);
Wolfe Bros. & Co. v. Hamilton, 165 F. 413,416 (C.C.A. 8); Thum Co. v. Dickinson, 245
F. 609, 621, 622 (C.C.A. 6); Wesson v. Gale£, (D.C.) 286 F. 621, 626. He may indeed
succeed in showing that it was; that, however bad his purpose, it will fail in execution; if
he does, he will win. Kann v. Diamond Steel Co., 89 F. 706, 713 (C.C.A. 8). But such
an intent raises a presumption that customers will be deceived."
38 See: United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 at 92,
Phillips v. Governor & Co., (9th Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 971 at 974;
(6th Cir. 1912) 198 F. 369 at 372; Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati,
F. (2d) 348 at 353; Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
357 (1916).

39 S.Ct. 48 (1918);
Merriam v. Saalfield,
(9th Cir. 1948) 166
403 at 413, 36 S.Ct.
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of the words "property" and "ownership" to describe trade-marks or
trade-mark rights. The courts have always been hard put to fit the law
of trade identification into some traditional "pigeon-hole." In early
cases of violation of trade identity, where the need for equitable relief
was obvious and the facts were clearly repugnant to the "conscience
of the chancellor," the courts satisfied their unavailing search for precedent by treating trade identification rights, especially when symbolized
in a particular mark, as a form of personal property or personal property right. 39 It is again significant and contradictory that the same
rights, when violated in fact situations described as "unfair competition," were rarely described as property rights. Instead, the justification
for equitable relief was usually, and quite properly, bottomed on the
"un fairness
·
" ofth e accused acts.
It seems self-evident that along with certain other "inalienable
rights" we are all endowed with the right to make free.use of letters of
the alphabet in such combinations as we may choose as well as all
words, marks, signs, colors or symbols to communicate with each other
or to 'adorn and describe our worldly goods. But just as freedom in the
use of language is not freedom to engage in libel, slander, or forgery,
so free use of the language, the letters, et cetera, is not freedom to invade or violate the trade identity of another. True, in the sense that
almost any legal right may, perhaps, be described as a "property" right,
so may trade-mark and trade identification rights be loosely referred to
as "property" rights. 40 But in the ordinary sense they are not, and the
ordinary connotations of the words "property" and "ownership" lead
only to error and contradiction in resolving the questions which arise
in trade identification cases. If one has property in words, then protection for that property is tantamount to protection for monopolies in
words. But, as demonstrated above, there is actually involved no vesting of specific proprietary right in any word or mark in protecting trade
identity within the limits of the area of likelihood of confusion. Such
so E.g.: Snoden v. Noah, 1 Hopkins Ch. Rep. 347 (N.Y. 1825); Phalon v. Wright, 5
Philadelphia 464 (1864); Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal. 293 (1865); Boardman v. The
Meriden Britannia Co., 35 Conn. 402 (1868); The Congress and Empire Spring Co. v.
The High Rock Congress Spring Co., 45 N.Y. 291 (6 Hand) (Ct. App. 1871). All of
the above cases and others in point may be found in Cox, AMERICAN TRADE MARK CAsEs
(1871). See also: Burnett v. Phalon, 5 Abb. Pr. Rep. (n.s.) 212, 3 Keyes 594 (1867) 1
Abb. Ct. A. 267; Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 at 322 (1871); and discussion in N1Ms,
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs, 4th ed., §198a (1947).
40 Even the right to do business with whom you choose has been referred to as a
"property" right. Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript Co., 249 Mass. 477, 144 N.E. 400
(1924).
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protection is all that is ever needed, and a recognition of this true right
is all that can exist compatible with the public interest.41
That which should be prohibited is the unfair act which violates or
is likely to invade the intangible individual trade identity, not the trespass upon an imagined property right in any particular word or syrnbol.42 If there is any property right involved, it is in the trader's good
will. It is not in the particular device which connects it to him and
which can always be used freely by another so long as not unfairly.

VII
An argument frequently offered in justification of the "monopoly"
approach to trade identification law is the view that certain words,
sounds or symbols are inherently so desirable as trade-marks that all
should have a right to their use.
Experts in advertising and sales promotion frequently assure their
clients that a certain trade-mark will sell their goods, while another will
not. Thus we have the most vociferous proponents of protection for
trade identification urging, in effect, that a "patent" should be obtained
on a given word because it has intrinsic value, attractiveness or charm
which will be imputed by the public to their client's goods and will
enhance their salability accordingly. Although business houses are
constantly spending large sums for such counsel, it appears highly questionable that the intrinsic qualities of any word or mark which may be
used as a trade-mark are of significant value in promoting the desired
continued sale of a given product. It appears doubtful that there is involved in protecting trade-mark rights, within the scope or area of likelihood of confusion, any vesting in actual effect, of even a limited (i.e.
41 Dr. Rudolf Callmann, author of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks, however,
is an ardent proponent of the "property'' concept of trade-mark rights. He urges that use
of a mark on goods so unrelated to those of the prior user that confusion is unlikely nevertheless "dilutes" a property right belonging to the prior user. See his article: "Unfair
Competition without Competition? The Importance of the Property Concept in the Law
of Trade-Marks," 95 Umv. PA. L. REv. 443 (1947). But the fact seems to be that even
though a commonplace mark such as Gold Medal has been appropriated by many others,
it still functions as well as ever to identify a well-known brand of flour. And if it were
properly protected by the courts within the area of likely confusion, its user would not
suffer through the subsequent and diverse third party uses. Moreover, the proposition that
third party use substantially narrows the area of a likelihood of confusion, although generally taken for granted, seems unworthy of the emphasis currently given it, and deserves
serious re-examination and, probably, much more restricted application.
42 E.g., DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., (2d Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d)
75 at 81: "The rights of the complainant must be based upon a wrong which the defendant
has done to it by misleading customers as to the origin of the goods sold and thus taking
away the trade. Such rights are not founded on a bare title to a word or symbol but on a
cause of action to prevent deception."
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trade identification) monopoly in anything of which the corresponding
use might be of appreciable and rightful value to another.
. For example, the words of the language which are laudatory or suggestive of quality or descriptive of the nature of various goods are constantly selected as trade-marks, but it seems obvious that insomuch as
a given word has a general connotation or meaning unrelated to identification significance, that much is it ineffective as a trade-mark. Thus,
if a mark praises or describes the goods to which it is applied, that much
it does not function as a trade-mark. It fails to that extent to relate the
goods to which it is applied to the party or his other goods. The user
may benefit, of course, from the praise or description, but only as he
might from other advertising or sales promotional use of laudatory or
descriptive words or phrases; and he must lose correspondingly in accomplishing identification, and, thus, continuity of sale. Protection of
the trade identification function of any descriptive or laudatory word
within the scope of likelihood of confusion cannot inhibit laudatory or
descriptive use of that word by another.
In trade identification it is certain that you cannot "ride two horses
at once"; for a given word, mark or symbol can only connote so much to
those who may encounter it. If the preponderance of its connotation
is laudatory or descriptive, then its identification potential is subordinated accordingly. It can be misused by another, nevertheless, if its limited though existent identification function is invaded so that confusion
is likely to result. But when it is comprehended that by the likelihood
of confusion test all that can be protected as to any trade-mark is its
identifying function, it is clear there can be no argument that, certain words being eminently desirable as trade-marks, a denial of their
identifying use to the latecomer grants an unjust monopoly to the prior
user.
It is interesting to project this thesis against the background of commercial fact. The famous trade-mark, Kodak, now connotes a particular
quality line of cameras put out by Eastman Kodak Company. Yet when
the mark was devised, it was a meaningless series of letters which, when
pronounced, resulted in a rather harsh, unattractive sound. Also consider the famous automobile sur-name trade-marks such as Buick, Ford,
Chrysler, and the others, and examine them for inherent attractiveness
or intrinsic value other than that which they have acquired in their
identification significance. "Cadillac," if spoken to an African bushman, once well might have connoted profanity, although one might
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wonder if today it has not acquired a "quality" secondary meaning even
to him. Did the letters "GE" have any mystic charm before they became associated in the minds of millions with the General Electric Company and their line of reliable products?43
For many years the Coca-Cola Company refused to ratify or accept
the public's nickname for their product, "Coke," on the ground that
"Coke" had misleading and undesirable narcotic or other connotations.
But public adoption eventually prevailed, and use, registration, and protection by the company inevitably followed. 44 Thus, one of the world's
most valued trade-marks came into being denied by its parent and
branded as obnoxious to its interests. Can it be argued that there exist
any intrinsic or inherent values in the combination of the letters
GO-K-E other than their indication of a particularly reputable product
of a particular commercial concern? Is the word public property in
that any and all use of it should be freely available to all?
Apparently there is little evidence to support the "intrinsic value''
notion, and there is much logic and fact to the contrary. But resolving all doubts in favor of the proposition, it can hardly justify denial of
protection where trade identity is invaded to an extent likely to deceive.
Even if we assume, arguendo, that certain words, marks, symbols, or
combinations of letters have some intrinsic value, and that protecting
their prior user within the area or scope of likelihood of confusion does
actually result in a certain finite kind of "monopoly" in them, is it not
a "monopoly" better encouraged than condemned?
CONCLUSION

It appears, therefore, that the "restrictionist'' trends and the contradictions found in many recent trade identification decisions are often
traceable to misconceptions derived from the current "monopoly phobia" which have no logical relation to the true rights and considerations
involved. Abetting this misguided and destructive reasoning are the
false "sign posts" provided by the traditional words and phrases such as,
"infringement," "property" and "ownership" as well as the deep seated
48 A few other examples of trade-marks conspicuously devoid of inherent attractiveness or intrinsic "sex appeal" are such household words as: Vicks, Pablum, Old Crow,
Vaseline, and Clorox.
44See: The Coca-Cola Company v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 41 S.Ct. 113 (1920).
See also opinion of District Court, (D.C. Ariz. 1916) 235 F. 408.
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"intrinsic value" notion. Yet the problem presented in almost any trade
identification case is the simple one: Has there been or is there likely
to be an invasion or violation of an individual trade identity? If so,
decency and the public interest demand that it be prevented insomuch
as deception is likely; that is, within the scope of likelihood of confusion.
No more is needed-no more should be sought; but too often today
these simple fundamentals are lost in a maze of semantic analysis and
unwarranted concern for wrongful monopoly or special privilege.
Is it not past time to free the law of commercial identity from the
error which threatens to engulf it, and to recognize as well "that business should be conducted as games are played among gentlemen?"

